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Dolan v. City of Tigard: A Sequel to Nollan's Essential
Nexus Test for Regulatory Takings
Recent efforts to articulate a clear doctrine for the analysis of
Fifth Amendment regulatory takings claims began in 1987 when the
United States Supreme Court decided a series of land-use cases.' In
Dolan v. City of Tigard,2 the Supreme Court again confronted the
difficult issue, facing the question of when government regulation of
private property through development exactions3 becomes a taking
of private property for public use without just compensation.4 The
1. The 1987 takings trilogy is composed of First English Evangelical Lutheran Church
v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987) (requiring compensation for temporary
taking due to restrictive flood control ordinance later invalidated); Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) (upholding a statute prohibiting certain
mining activity because the restrictions were reasonably related to the purpose of
preventing environmental damage); and Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S.
825 (1987) (holding that requiring a property owner to provide an easement across his
beach in exchange for a rebuilding permit was a taking because the condition was not suf-
ficiently related to the stated purpose of preserving public access to the shore). See, e.g.,
Charles H. Clarke, Constitutional Property Rights and the Taking of Police Power: The
Aftermath of Nollan and First English, 20 SW. U. L. REV. 1, 12-26 (1991); Susan E.
Looper-Friedman, Constitutional Rights as Property?: The Supreme Court's Solution to the
"Takings Issue," 15 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 31, 44-49 (1990); John Martinez, A Critical
Analysis of the 1987 Takings Trilogy: The Keystone, Nollan and First English Cases, 1
HOFSTRA PROP. L.J. 39, 41-72 (1988).
2. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
3. A development exaction is a common land use regulation defined as "an internal
subdivision improvement, a dedication of land for a public facility, or a fee in lieu of
dedication that the municipality can use to provide a public facility." DANIEL R.
MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 9.11, at 372 (2d ed. 1988). See, e.g., Gus Bauman &
William H. Ethier, Development Exactions and Impact Fees: A Survey of American
Practices, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 51, 55-62 (1987); John J. Delaney et al., The
Needs-Nexus Analysis: A Unified Test for Validating Subdivision Exactions, User Impact
Fees and Linkage, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139, 147-56 (1987); William A. Fischel,
The Economics of Land Use Exactions: A Property Rights Analysis, 50 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 101, 110-13 (1987); see also Nicholas V. Morosoff, Note, " 'Take' My Beach
Please!". Nollan v. California Coastal Commission and a Rational-Nexus Constitutional
Analysis of Development Exactions, 69 B.U. L. REV. 823, 823 (1989) (defining exactions
as when "a municipality requires a developer to give something"-usually a dedication of
land or a cash payment--"to the community as condition of receiving permission to
develop").
4. The Takings Clause in the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution
states in part: "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compen-
sation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Supreme Court has incorporated the Fifth
Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process provision so that it applies
to the states. See Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S 226,235-41 (1897). See, e.g.,
Richard A. Epstein, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 103-34 (1985); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., A Critical Reexamination of the Takings
Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1892, 1965 n.1 (1992). See generally William M. Treanor,
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Dolan Court specifically addressed a question left unanswered in one
of its landmark cases of 1987, Nollan v. California Coastal Commis-
sion.' While Nollan held that there must be an "essential nexus"
between permit conditions and the development's impact on the
community,6 the Dolan Court considered what degree of an essential
nexus must exist between the conditions and the proposed impact of
the development for government takings to withstand constitutional
scrutiny.7 Because lower courts applied the Nollan essential nexus
requirement with varying levels of scrutiny, the Dolan Court refined
the Nollan analysis by articulating a standard of rough proportionality
that reflects the intermediate rational nexus test utilized by many
lower courts prior to Dolan.! To separate takings doctrine from
equal protection analysis, the Court distinguished the new rough
proportionality terminology from the phrase "rational nexus test."9
This Note focuses on the Court's latest development in the
regulatory takings arena-the rough proportionality standard. First,
the Note presents a brief summary of the Court's opinion in Dolan.10
Then the Note examines relevant Supreme Court takings law and
lower court decisions that have interpreted and applied the Nollan
essential nexus test. The Note next argues that, while the test
Note, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, 94 YALE LJ. 694,708-16 (1985) (discussing the historical development of the
Takings Clause).
The use and ownership of private property can generally be regulated by zoning
restrictions to protect public welfare. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112
S. Ct. 2886, 2897 (1987) (describing the power of government to regulate property as the
power to promote "health, safety, morals, or general welfare"); Village of Euclid v. Amber
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) (holding that zoning regulations are constitutionally
valid unless "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the
public health, safety, morals or general welfare"). See generally JESSE DUKEMINIER &
JAMES E. KRiER, PROPERTY 991, 1005 (3d ed. 1993) (explaining that municipalities act
through their police power-the power to protect health, safety, welfare and morals-when
they establish zoning regulations). However, when regulations substantially limit the
owner's use and enjoyment of his property, a takings claim might arise. See infra notes
86-120 and accompanying text; see also Robert H. Freilich, Solving the "Taking" Equation:
Making the Whole Equal to the Sum of its Parts, in REGULATORY TAKINGS: THE LIMITS
OF LAND USE CONTROL 89, 96 (G. Richard Hill ed., 1993) (stating that even early zoning
cases began to place significant limits on the scope of police power to act through
regulatory zoning).
5. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
6. Id. at 837.
7. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2316.
8. Id. at 2319-20; see also infra notes 191-95 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 48-55 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 16-85 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 86-174 and accompanying text.
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formulated in Dolan appears to be a new development, the rough
proportionality standard logically follows from the previous takings
doctrine the Court has articulated and lower courts have applied. 2
Finally, the Note suggests that, in addition to developing a
constitutionally mandated level of scrutiny for regulatory takings, 3
the most significant impact of Dolan appears to be a shift in the
burden of proof' 4 Following Dolan, government regulatory bodies
will have the burden of proving that required development exactions
are roughly proportional to a developer's impact.'
The petitioner in Dolan applied to the City of Tigard, Oregon for
a building permit, proposing to double the size of her store and to
pave and expand the parking lot. 6 Dolan's property is located in
the central business district of Tigard along the banks of Fanno
Creek.' The City Planning Commission approved Dolan's ap-
plication, subject to conditions imposed by the Community Develop-
ment Code (CDC), the comprehensive land use plan for the City of
Tigard. 8 First, the city required that Dolan dedicate the 7,000
square feet of her property lying within Fanno Creek's 100-year
floodplain to the city for improvement of a storm drainage system. 9
Second, the city required the dedication of an additional fifteen
square feet located adjacent to the flood plain to be used as a
pedestrian and bicycle pathway.2
To justify these regulations, the city cited the objectives of the
comprehensive land use management program adopted by the State
of Oregon in 1973.21 Upon the completion of various studies
12. See infra notes 175-219 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 220-36 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 237-45 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 237-45 and accompanying text.
16. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2313.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 2314; see also infra notes 21-35 (describing the CDC's comprehensive land
use plan). In addition to the conditions at issue in the decision, the city also initially
imposed three other conditions on the Dolans. First, the city required a $14,256.02 traffic
impact fee which was later eliminated as a specific condition of approval. Petitioner's
Brief at 8 n.2, Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994) (No. 93-518). Second, "a fee
in lieu of water quality" was required in order to offset the negative effects of increased
storm water runoff from the Dolans' proposed larger lot. Id. Third, the city required the
relocation of the "footprint of their building to the east in order to accommodate the
future City-initiated relocation of the flood bank." Id.
19. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2314.
20. Il-
21. OR. REv. STAT. §§ 197.005-197.860 (1991).
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relating to open spaces, 2 flood plains, and transportation,24 the
City of Tigard developed its own land use plan in connection with the
state's requirements, and the plan was codified in the Community
Development Code (CDC)?' The flood plain dedication re-
quirement was based on findings from the Tigard Master Drainage
Plan that "serves as the basis for the City's Comprehensive Plan
policies and regulatory provisions relating to floodplain
management."26 The drainage plan determined that development
within the Fanno Creek Basin would increase flooding problems
because the proposed larger building and paved parking area would
increase the amount of impervious surfaces, thereby increasing the
amount of runoff into the creek. 7 The plan proposed to combat
flooding risks by excavating the channel area next to Dolan's property
along the creek.' Furthermore, the drainage plan recommended
that the flood plains be kept free of structures and that areas within
the flood plain be preserved as greenways.29 The city argued that
the flood plain dedication was reasonably related to the projected
impact of the proposed development due to the anticipated increase
in storm water flow from Dolan's property into the creek."
The CDC also required new development in the congested
central business district to dedicate land for pedestrian and bicycle
pathways to encourage alternatives to automobile travel.31 The city
argued that Dolan's proposed development would generate additional
22. The Community Development Code "requires property owners in the area zoned
Central Business District to comply with a 15% open space and landscaping requirement."
Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2313.
23. The Master Drainage Plan suggested a series of improvements to the Fanno Creek
Basin that would protect against the increased likelihood of flooding following
development in the area. Id. at 2313.
24. A transportation study of the area "identified congestion in the Central Business
District as a particular problem." Id.
25. Id.
26. Respondent's Brief at 6, Dolan (No. 93-518).
27. Id. at 7.
28. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2313 ("The Drainage Plan concluded that the cost of these
improvements should be shared based on both direct and indirect benefits, with property
owners along the waterways paying more due to the direct benefit they would receive.").
29. Id. By keeping the flood plain free, the city also hoped to utilize the land as a
public park. In their brief, the city argued that "[p]ursuant to the Tigard Park Plan, a
specific Fanno Creek Park Plan has been adopted by the City. The concept of joint use
of the floodplain for storm drainage, recreation and transportation is built into this plan
through integration of the pedestrian/bikeway plan." Respondent's Brief at 9, Dolan (No.
93-518).
30. Respondent's Brief at 14-15, Dolan (No. 93-518).
31. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2313.
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vehicular traffic,32 and that the "creation of a convenient, safe
pedestrian/bicycle pathway system as an alternative means of
transportation 'could offset some of the traffic demand on (nearby)
streets and lessen the increase in traffic.' "' The city reasoned that
Dolan would obtain benefits from the construction of a pathway in
the form of more business and also from a reduction in traffic conges-
tion. 4 Overall, the city's dedication requirements would restrict the
use of ten percent of Dolan's property.35
When the City Planning Commission denied Dolan's request for
a variance, she appealed to the Land Use Board of Appeals
(LUBA), 6 alleging that "the city's dedication requirements were not
related to the proposed development, and, therefore, those re-
quirements constituted an uncompensated taking of property under
the Fifth Amendment."'37 LUBA rejected Dolan's claim, and she
appealed to the Oregon Court of Appeals38 and the Oregon
Supreme Court.39 Both courts affirmed the opinions of the City
Planning Commission and LUBA, concluding that the conditions were
justified as reasonably related to the impact of the expansion of the
petitioner's business.' Apparently, these courts believed that the
appropriate standard for reviewing development exactions was the
reasonable relationship level of scrutiny, the least demanding
32. Respondent's Brief at 17, Dolan (No. 93-518).
33. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2315 (citations omitted).
34. Respondent's Brief at 11-12, Dolan (No. 93-518). The city required only the
dedication of an easement for the bicycle path, not the actual construction of the path
because "[t]o impose a bikeway construction requirement, the City must conclude that the
development will principally benefit from the improvement." Id.35. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2314. One aspect of the CDC "requires property owners in
the area zoned Central Business District to comply with a 15% open space and
landscaping requirement, which limits total site coverage, including all structures and paved
parking, to 85% of the parcel." Id at 2313. The city noted that Dolan could use the
dedicated property to meet the 15% open space requirement. Id. at 2314.
36. Dolan v. City of Tigard, LUBA 91-161 (Jan. 7, 1992).
37. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2315.
38. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 832 P.2d 853 (Or. Ct. App. 1992), affd, 854 P.2d 437 (Or.
1993), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
39. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 854 P.2d 437 (Or. 1993), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
40. Dolan, 854 P.2d at 443; Dolan, 832 P.2d at 856. The Commission noted that
it is reasonable to assume that customers and employees of the future uses of this
site could utilize a pedestrian/bicycle pathway adjacent to this development for
their transportation and recreational needs.... [T]he required flood plain
dedication would be reasonably related to the petitioner's request to intensify the
use of the site given the increase in the impervious surface.
Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2314-15.
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standard.4 To define the correct standard, the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversed, and remanded.
The majority' opinion, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
concluded that the Court must first determine whether an" 'essential
nexus' exists between [a] 'legitimate state interest' and the permit
condition exacted by the city.' ,42 The test established in Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission43 was employed as the question asked
in the regulatory takings analysis: Is the exaction reasonably likely to
achieve what it is meant to achieve?' Because the Court did not
find an essential nexus in Nollan,45 the Dolan majority was not
required to articulate "the required degree of connection between the
exactions and the projected impact of the proposed development."46
In Dolan, however, the Court held that the permit conditions would
substantially advance the legitimate state interests of preventing
flooding along Fanno Creek and reducing downtown traffic conges-
tion; therefore, the essential nexus did exist.47
After establishing that the state interests met the essential nexus
test, the Court proceeded to analyze the degree of connection
required between the city's exactions and the proposed development's
impact.' The Court reviewed a series of state court decisions for
insight on what level of scrutiny to apply to takings cases, 49 and
concluded:
We think a term such as "rough proportionality" best encap-
sulates what we hold to be the requirement of the Fifth
Amendment. No precise mathematical calculation is
required, but the city must make some sort of individualized
determination that the required dedication is related both in
nature and extent to the impact of the proposed develop-
ment.
50
41. Dolan, 854 P.2d at 449; Dolan, 832 P.2d at 856; see also infra notes 182-85 and
accompanying text.
42. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2317 (quoting Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S.
825, 837 (1987)).
43. 483 U.S. 825 (1987); see also infra notes 121-31 and accompanying text (discussing
Nollan).
44. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
45. Id.
46. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2317; see also infra notes 175-76 and accompanying text
(maintaining that the Dolan test is a logical step in the Court's takings doctrine).
47. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. 2317-18.
48. Id. at 2318.
49. Id. at 2318-19; see also infra notes 182-95 and accompanying text (discussing the
various tests that states have applied and the Dolan Court's reaction to them).
50. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2319-20.
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The Court thus defined the necessary connection that must be shown
between the development exactions and the projected impact of the
project as a standard of rough proportionality.5 Although the Court
actually adopted the intermediate test often referred to as the rational
nexus standard,52 Chief Justice Rehnquist intentionally rephrased the
standard to avoid confusion with the rational-relation standard often
applied in equal protection analysis. 3 Although no precise cal-
culation is necessary, the Court requires local government to
demonstrate that the dedication requirement is related both in degree
and nature to the impact of the project. Therefore, under Dolan,
local planning agencies must now show that permit conditions
imposed on planned developments are roughly proportional to the
projected impact of the development 5
Based on this framework, the Court considered whether the city's
findings were sufficient to justify the dedication conditions imposed
on Dolan's building permit. The Court agreed that keeping the flood
plain open and free of structures was a valid means of reducing the
increased risk of flooding that would result from an increase in
impervious surfaces 6 However, the Court rejected the city's
contention that a public greenway was needed to reduce flooding.57
The Court found that the city made no individualized determination
of why Dolan should have to forfeit her ability to exclude others from
her property. 8 Noting that the right to exclude others from one's
'51. Id. at 2319.
52. See infra notes 191-97 and accompanying text. The intermediate rough
proportionality test strikes a middle ground between the rigorous "uniquely and
specifically attributable" test and the less exacting "reasonable relationship" test. See infra
notes 182-95 and accompanying text. Although the Court refers to this standard as the
reasonable relationship test, most scholars writing on takings have called the intermediate
level of scrutiny the rational nexus test. See infra note 191 and accompanying text.
53. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2319. In the majority opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated:
We think the "reasonable relationship test" adopted by a majority of the state
courts is closer to the federal constitutional norm than either of those previously
discussed. But we do not adopt it as such, partly because the term "reasonable
relationship" seems confusingly similar to the term "rational basis" which
describes the minimal level of scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.
Id. See generally JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD S. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 573-
90 (4th ed. 1991) (describing standards of scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause).
54. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2319-20.
55. Id. at 2320.
56. Id. In addition, the Court noted that to comply with the 15% open spaces
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property has traditionally been safeguarded,59 the Court refused to
deprive Dolan of that property right when the state interest could
similarly be achieved through a private greenway.' If the Court
upheld the dedication, Dolan "would lose all rights to regulate the
time in which the public entered onto the Greenway, regardless of
any interference it might pose with her retail store. Her right to
exclude would not be regulated, it would be eviscerated.""1
The Court similarly rejected the pedestrian and bicycle pathway
dedication as not roughly proportional to the impact of Dolan's new
building.6' The Court acknowledged that in some instances a city
may require a dedication of private property for streets and sidewalks
to avoid excessive congestion.63 In Dolan, however, the city failed
to meet "its burden of demonstrating that the additional number of
vehicle and bicycle trips generated by the petitioner's development
reasonably relate to the city's requirement for a dedication of the
pedestrian/bicycle pathway easement. ' Instead of merely finding
that the pathway "could" or "might" offset traffic, the Court
explained that the city needed to demonstrate in some quantifiable
way how its findings show the pathway "will" or "is likely to" offset
congestion generated by the new building. As a result, the Court
59. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979) (holding that" 'the
right to exclude,' so universally held to be a fundamental element of the property right,
falls within this category of interests that the Government cannot take without
compensation"); see also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,
435 (1982) (arguing that "[t]he power to exclude has traditionally been considered one
of the most treasured strands in an owner's bundle of property rights"); Richard A.
Epstein, Property and Necessity, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 2,3 (1990) (arguing that the
right to exclude is an absolute private property right).
60. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2321. The majority distinguished Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v.
Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980), in which the Court held under the First Amendment that
a private shopping center does not have the right to exclude people who wish to distribute
political pamphlets to shoppers. Id. at 88. The Court noted that the shopping center could
establish regulations restricting the time, place, and manner in which the pamphlets could
be distributed. Id. at 83. In Dolan, however, the city's dedication requirement would per-
manently allow recreational visitors. See Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2320.
61. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2321.
62. Id. at 2322.
63. Id. at 2321. Based on this decision, dedications can only be required if
substantiated by empirical findings that describe how an individual project will contribute
to the traffic congestion. See id. at 2322.
64. Id. at 2321.
65. Id. at 2322. The vagueness of the Dolan decision is quite evident in this section
as the Court demanded that the city make a quantifiable showing but then added that
"[n]o precise mathematical calculation is necessary." Id.
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determined that the exactions failed to satisfy the required degree of
connection to the projected impact of the development.66
Justice Stevens's dissent, joined by Justice Blackmun and Justice
Ginsburg, criticized the Court's erection of a "new constitutional
hurdle in the path of [the city's] conditions."'67 First, Justice Stevens
argued that in developing the rough proportionality requirement, the
majority mistakenly relied on state cases, most of which were not
decided with constitutional questions in mind. 8 Second, he argued
that the Court merely acknowledged the rights taken away from the
property owner and failed to consider the benefits that Dolan was
also likely to gain from the conditions.69 Dolan would receive added
protection against the risk of flooding because the city's excavation of
the flood plain area would widen the channel's capacity to carry water
during storms.70 Justice Stevens maintained that, instead of simply
looking at ihe exaction's effect on one strand of property rights, the
Court should have considered the effect on the whole bundle,7'
which would include an assessment of the benefits derived from the
conditions.
72
Criticizing the majority's rough proportionality test as too
demanding upon the city's practice of land use planning, Justice
Stevens argued that the proper inquiry for determining the validity of
development exactions should be whether the required essential nexus
was present.73 According to Justice Stevens, the Nollan test should
be expanded only in limited circumstances,74 and the Court should
"venture beyond considerations of a condition's nature or ger-
inaneness only if the developer establishes that a concededly germane
condition is so grossly disproportionate to the proposed development's
adverse effects that it manifests motives other than land use
regulation on the part of the city." s
66. See supra notes 48-55 and accompanying text.
67. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2323 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
68. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 2324 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
70. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
71. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979),
which stated that "[a]t least where an owner possesses a full 'bundle' of property rights,
the destruction of one 'strand' of the bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate must
be viewed in its entirety").
72. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting)..
73. Id. at 2325 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
74. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
75. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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A key concern for Justice Stevens was the impact the Dolan test
will have on the burden of proof in takings cases. The majority's test
established a standard that local planning agencies must meet;76
Justice Stevens, on the other hand, contended that property owners
should have the burden of contesting development exactions.'
Justice Stevens argued that, by placing the burden on local
government, the majority severely hampered the city's effort to
implement a zoning scheme to provide for public safety." He
contended that public interest in zoning has been adequately
demonstrated such that "[i]f the government can demonstrate that the
conditions it has imposed in a land-use permit are rational, impartial
and conducive to fulfilling the aims of a valid land-use plan, a strong
presumptive validity should attach to those conditions. 79  If a
private property owner wishes to challenge the constitutionality of a
regulation the state has demonstrated to be rational, Justice Stevens
argued, then she should have to prove that the condition un-
reasonably impairs her expectations as a private property owner.80
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Souter argued that the
case could have been decided under the essential nexus test of
Nollan.8' Regarding the flood plain easement, Justice Souter
contended that, in essence, the majority decided there was no nexus
between the exaction of a public area and the government interest in
protecting against flooding.' With respect to the bicycle path,
Justice Souter argued that the majority actually decided that the
bicycle path was not related to the legitimate interest in reducing
congestion because the city merely showed that the path could offset
traffic. 3 Because the essential nexus test can be used to invalidate
the dedication requirements, Justice Souter would have ended the
inquiry there: "Nollan, therefore, is satisfied, and on that assumption
the city's conditions should not be held to fail a further rough propor-
tionality test or any other that might be devised to give meaning to
the constitutional limits."' While the majority reasoned that Dolan
simply sharpened the Nollan decision by defining the degree of
76. See id at 2322.
77. Id. at 2330 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
78. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 2329-30 (Stevens, ., dissenting).
80. Id. at 2330 (Stevens, L, dissenting).
81. Id (Souter, J., dissenting).
82. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
83. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 2331 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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connection that satisfied the essential nexus standard, Justice Souter
maintained that Dolan inappropriately extended the doctrine of
regulatory takings by establishing a new testy
Supreme Court analysis of regulatory takings 6 stems from the
landmark opinion of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.8 In Pennsyl-
vania Coal, the Court recognized for the first time that the regulation
of private property could constitute a taking requiring just compen-
sation under the Fifth Amendment.' At issue in Pennsylvania Coal
was the validity of a state coal mining regulation that forbade the
mining of anthracite coal "to protect the lives and safety of the
public." 9 The coal company owning the rights to mine anthracite
coal challenged the regulation, arguing that its property had been
taken. In an opinion written by Justice Holmes, the Court ack-
nowledged that government regulation of private property may be
permissible in some circumstances; however, "if regulation goes too
far it will be recognized as a taking."'" Under the facts of this case,
85. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
86. For a general overview of regulatory takings, see Robert H. Freilich & Elizabeth
A. Garvin, Takings After Lucas: Growth Managemen Planning, and Regulatory
Implementation Will Work Better Than Before, in AFTER LUCAS: LAND USE
REGULATION AND THE TAKING OF PROPERTY WITHOUT COMPENSATION 53, 54-61
(David L. Callies ed., 1993). Freilich and Garvin categorize regulatory takings into three
types: physical, economic, and title. Physical takings involve regulatory action that
amounts to a literal physical invasion of private property. Id.; see also Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982) (holding that the
permanent physical occupation of the cable lines in the owner's apartment building which
was authorized by the government was a per se taking); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444
U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979) (holding that the government's attempt to require the owner of a
privately owned pond to make the waters accessible to public use was an infringement on
the owner's right to exclude others and therefore constituted a taking). Economic takings
occur when a government regulation fails to advance a legitimate state interest and
deprives the owner of all economic benefit of his property. Freilich & Garvin, supra, at
59; see also Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2901-02 (1992)
(finding that when a regulation deprives an owner of all economically viable uses of her
property, just compensation is required-regardless of the public interest supporting the
regulation-unless the proposed use is prohibited under nuisance law). A title taking
"places a restriction on the use of the property that significantly interferes with the
incidents of ownership. This situation is most common where local government seeks
development exactions from the property owner, such as land dedications or exactions in
lieu of dedication." Freilich & Garvin, supra, at 56. The type of taking at issue in Dolan
would fit into Freilich & Garvin's "title taking" category.
87. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
88. Id. at 415.
89. Id. at 397; see, e.g., Joseph F. DiMento, Mining the Archives of Pennsylvania Coal-
Heaps of Constitutional Mischief, 11 J. LEGAL HIST. 396, 396-405 (1990).
90. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 395.
91. Id. at 415.
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the Court held that the regulation went "too far" because it essential-
ly destroyed the coal company's property rights, making it commer-
cially impracticable for the coal to be mined.'
Since the decision in Pennsylvania Coal, the Court has been
plagued by the need to determine which government regulations
placed on permits go too far and constitute takings. In 1928, the
Court employed a due process analysis to invalidate a zoning
ordinance in Nectow v. City of Cambridge.' In Nectow, a property
owner challenged the constitutionality of a city zoning ordinance that
had placed 100 feet of his property in a residential district, thereby
prohibiting any business or industrial use on the remaining property
that had been designated as "unrestricted."94 The owner claimed
that, under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process clause, the
ordinance had deprived him of the use of his property." The Court
held that by including only 100 feet of the plaintiff's property in a
residential district, the zoning ordinance did not bear a "substantial
relation" to the objective of promoting the public welfare.96 Because
the property easily could have been rezoned to make the plaintiff's
entire lot unrestricted with little or no impact on the surrounding
community, the Court found that the zoning ordinance failed the
substantial relation test and resulted in a "highly injurious" invasion
of private property.'
The Supreme Court's next major step occurred fifty years after
the Court's decision in Nectow. In Penn Central Transportation Co.
v. New York City,98 the Court refined the standard of review for
regulatory takings by providing specific guidelines based on the
previous strands of takings law. At issue in Penn Central was New
York City's Landmarks Preservation Law.' Under the law, owners
of buildings or sites designated as landmarks must apply to the
92. Id. at 414.
93. 277 U.S. 183, 188-89 (1928). For a general discussion of Nectow, see James E.
Brookshire, "Taking" the Time to Look Backward, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 901, 921 (1993).
94. Nectow, 277 U.S. at 186.
95. Id. at 185.
96. Id. at 188. The Court held that the government may place regulations on the use
of private property through zoning ordinances; however, "such restriction cannot be
imposed if it does not bear a substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or
general welfare." Id.
97. Id at 188-89.
98. 438 U.S. 104 (1978); see, e.g., Leslie Pickering Francis, Note, Penn Central
Transportation Company v. N.Y.C.: Easy Taking-Clause Cases Make Uncertain Law, 1980
UTAH L. REV. 369, 379-80.
99. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 109-11.
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Landmark Preservation Commission in order to develop or renovate
their property.'" The plaintiff, owner of Grand Central Station, a
designated landmark, applied to the Commission for permission to
build offices above the terminal.' When the Commission rejected
the plaintiffs plans, finding them destructive of the terminal's historic
and aesthetic features, Penn Central filed suit, claiming that
government application of the Landmarks Law resulted in a taking of
their property without just compensation.' 2
In upholding the Landmarks Law, the Court stated that "[t]he
restrictions imposed are substantially related to the promotion of the
general welfare."'1 3 The Court articulated three factors to be con-
sidered within the takings framework: the economic impact of the
regulation, the interference with the owner's reasonable investment-
backed expectations, and the character of the government action. °4
The imposed restrictions in the Landmarks Law did not deny the
owner all economic use of the property because use as a terminal
guaranteed that Penn Central could realize its reasonable investment-
backed expectations. 5 Furthermore, because the regulation was
substantially related to advancing the public purpose of improving
quality of life in the city, the Court rejected the plaintiff's taking
claim."t In addition to supplying these factors, the Penn Central
opinion recognized that "[iun deciding whether a particular
governmental action has effected a taking" the Court must look to
both "the character of the action and.., the nature and extent of the
interference with rights in the parcel as a whole."' 7 Following Penn
100. Id. at 111-12.
101. Id. at 116.
102. Id. at 119.
103. Id. at 138.
104. Id. at 124. The Court explained:
In engaging in these essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries, the Court's decisions
have identified several factors that have particular significance. The economic
impaqt of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the
regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations are, of
course, relevant considerations. So, too, is the character of the governmental
action. A "taking" may more readily be found when the interference with
property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government, than when
interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens
of economic life to promote the common good.
Id. (citation omitted).
105. Id. at 136-37.
106. Id. at 138.
107. Id. at 130-31.
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Central, the Court began to specifically define these points in the
regulatory takings framework.
The Court further developed its standard of review for regulatory
takings in Agins v. City of Tiburon,' when it examined two city
ordinances to discern if they "substantially advance[d] legitimate state
interests."'" In Agins, the plaintiff property owners planned to
build a residential development and purchased five acres of
unimproved land."0 After the plaintiffs had purchased the property,
the City of Tiburon, as required by state law, developed a general
land-use plan relating to the development of open space"' and
"adopted two ordinances that modified existing zoning re-
quirements."'' Under the new ordinances, the plaintiffs' property
was zoned "RPD-I," which permitted only "one-family dwellings,
accessory buildings, and open space" areas."3  Furthermore, a
density restriction limited construction on the plaintiffs' five acre tract
to between "one and five single family residences.""14 The property
owners filed suit, claiming that these regulations violated both the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments."'
Holding in favor of the city, the Court, citing both Nectow and
Penn Central, ruled that "[t]he application of a general zoning law to
particular property effects a taking if the ordinance does not
substantially advance legitimate state interests.., or denies an owner
economically viable use of his land.""16 Under the facts of Agins,
the Court concluded that the open space zoning ordinance did
substantially advance legitimate governmental goals since they were
implemented to protect the city from over-development." In
addition, the Court found that the plaintiffs had not been stripped of
all economically viable use of their property because they could still
build five houses on the property. 8  The Court noted that the
relevant inquiry for finding a taking of private property was a
108. 447 U.S. 255 (1980). For a general discussion of Agins v. City of Tiburon, see
Brookshire, supra note 93, at 923-24; Patrick Sullivan, Note, Regulatory Takings-the Weak
& the Strong, 1 Mo. ENvTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 66, 69 (1993).
109. Agins, 447 U.S. at 260 (citing Nestow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928)).





115. Id. at 258.
116. Id. at 260 (citations omitted).
117. Id. at 261.
118. Id. at 262.
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determination of whether a private person alone is being asked to
bear "the burden of an exercise of state power in the public
interest.""' 9 Therefore, because the ordinances applied equally to
all property holders in the city, no taking resulted from their
implementation. 12°
In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission," the Supreme
Court developed a rule for applying the test articulated in Agins that
a regulation "substantially advance legitimate state interests."'
The Nollans applied to the California Coastal Commission for a
permit to demolish a small dilapidated bungalow on their beach-front
property and replace it with a larger house." The Commission
approved the permit subject to the condition that the Nollans grant
a lateral easement to the state that would allow the public to pass
over their property located between their seawall and the ocean.
The rationale behind the condition, as articulated by the Commission,
was that the new house would block the public's view of the ocean
and prevent the public from realizing there was a strip of accessible
coastline nearby." Therefore, the Commission argued that the
Nollans needed to alleviate the negative impact of their development
by providing lateral access across their beach, allowing the public to
walk between two public beaches on either side of the Nollans'
lot.26 The Nollans challenged the condition under the Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause.27
Holding for the Nollans, the Court ruled that an unconstitutional
taking of property had occurred because the permit condition did not
119. Id. at 260.
120. Id. at 262.
121. 483 U.S. 825 (1987). For an analysis of Nollan, see Timothy A. Bittle, Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission: You Can't Always Get What You Want, But Sometimes
You Get What You Need, 15 PEPP. L. REv. 345 (1988); Mitchell F. Disney, Fear and
Loathing on the California Coastline: Are Coastal Commission Property Exactions
Constitutional? 14 PEPP. L. REv. 357 (1987); Jerold S. Kayden, Land-Use Regulations,
Rationality, and Judicial Review: The RSVP in the Nollan Invitation (Part I), 23 URB. LAW
301 (1991); Nathaniel S. Lawrence, Means, Motives, and Takings: The Nexus Test of
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 12 HARV. ENTL. L. REV. 231 (1988); Note,
Taking a Step Back. A Reconsideration of the Takings Test ofNollan v. California Coastal
Commission, 102 HARv. L. REv. 448 (1988).
122. See Agins, 447 U.S. at 260-62.
123. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 829.
127. Id.
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substantially advance a legitimate state interest." For the permit
to substantially advance a legitimate state interest, the Court decided
that there must be an "essential nexus"'2 9 between the state's public
purpose for requiring the condition and the condition itself. The
Court failed to find an essential nexus in Nollan because there was no
relationship between the stated objective of ensuring visual access to
the beach and "the requirement that people already on the public
beaches be able to walk across the Nollans' property."3 The Court
noted that "unless the permit condition serves the same governmental
purpose as the development ban, the building restriction is not a valid
regulation of land use but 'an out-and-out plan of extortion.' ,"
Therefore, Nollan required an essential nexus but failed to state how
tight that nexus should be or what type of relationship should be
required between the permit condition and the governmental purpose.
Until Dolan, the Court's decision in Nollan had been the last
word on regulatory title takings.32 Lower courts have had difficulty
in consistently applying the essential nexus standard precisely because
the Nollan decision did not state what degree of connection should be
required to have an "essential nexus."'3 Some lower courts have
reacted to Nollan by diligently examining whether the relationship
between the condition and the stated purpose satisfies the essential
nexus standard." 4 In a 1990 New York case, Castle Properties Co.
v. Ackerson,35 for example, a property owner challenged a decision
of the town planning board that had 'imposed conditions on the
128. .Id. at 837.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 838.
131. Id. at 837 (quoting J.E.D. Assocs., Inc. v. Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14-15 (N.H.
1981)).
132. Since Nollan was handed down in 1987, the Court has ruled on only one other
major takings case that dealt with an economic taking. See Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2889 (1992); see also supra note 86 (discussing Lucas).
133. See Commercial Builders v. City of Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1997 (1992), discussed infra notes 161-65; William J. Jones Ins. Trust
v. City of Fort Smith, 731 F. Supp. 912,914 (W.D. Ark. 1990), discussed infra notes 142-49;
Blue Jeans Equities W. v. City & County, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 114, 117-18 (Cal. Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 191 (1992), discussed infra notes 166-74; Castle Properties Co. v.
Ackerson, 558 N.Y.S.2d 334, 336 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990), discussed infra notes 135-41;
Board of Supervisors v. Fiechter, 566 A.2d 370, 373 (Pa. Commw. 1989), discussed infra
notes 150-59.
134. See infra notes 135-59 and accompanying text; see also infra Cherry Hills Resort
Dev. Co. v. City of Cherry Hills, 790 P.2d 827, 832-33 (Colo. 1990) (en banc); Frisella v.
Town of Farmington, 550 A.2d 102,106 (N.H. 1988); Unlimited v. Kitsap County, 750 P.2d
651, 653-54 (Wash. App.'1988).
135. 558 N.Y.S.2d 334 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
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approval of his final site plan for an office and warehouse building in
a planned industry zoning district.36 The Planning Board con-
ditioned approval of the final site plan on the dedication of a fifteen-
foot road-widening strip and the dedication of a thirty-foot easement
along the rear of plaintiff's property to provide access for abutting
property owners.137 In support of the dedication conditions, the
Planning Board relied on data compiled by a consultant indicating the
need for alleviation of traffic congestion. 38  However, the board
admitted that "there is no empirical data to support a finding that the
proposed building will affect the flow of traffic."'39 Conceding that
a town planning board can impose reasonable conditions meant to
further the general public welfare, the New York appellate court
ruled that in the absence of specific empirical data showing the
relation between the projected impact of the building in terms of
traffic and the condition imposed, the Planning Board's behavior was
arbitrary and capricious." The court noted that "there is no
evidence to support a finding that [the dedication conditions] are
needed other than the conclusion, based upon mere speculation, that
traffic will be adversely affected by the project."'' Requiring
empirical data, the New York appellate court interpreted the Nollan
essential nexus test to require a tighter connection in order to validate
regulatory conditions.
Similarly, in the case of William J. Jones Insurance Trust v. City
of Fort Smith,'4 - a federal district court in Arkansas ruled that more
specific data was required to uphold a right-of-way dedication
requirement. 43 In William J. Jones Insurance, the property owner
applied to the city for permission to build a convenience store near
his gas station.'" The city granted permission to build, on the
condition that the property owner dedicate to the city an expanded
right of way along the street so that the avenue could be widened in
136. Id. at 335-36.
137. Id. at 336. Other conditions included relocating telephone poles, paving a 15-foot
road widening strip, delivering a covenant agreeing to gratuitously dedicate an additional
20-foot road-widening strip to the state if needed, and installing permanent fountains
within drainage retention basins. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 336-37.
141. Id. at 336.
142. 731 F. Supp. 912 (W.D. Ark. 1990).
143. Id. at 914.
144. Id. at 913.
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the future. 45 The property owner brought suit, alleging a taking of
private property without just compensation.' Relying on Nollan,
the court ruled that, to justify the dedication requirements, the city
had to show how the plaintiff's business expansion would create
additional burdens on the public street. 47 The plaintiff produced
testimony showing that an increase in business on his property would
not necessarily result in increased traffic because congestion might
actually result from a redistribution of existing traffic."¢ Because
the city failed to provide evidence showing "what incremental traffic
change, if any, could reasonably be expected from plaintiff's change
in land use," the court found the permit condition un-
constitutiona' 49
In Board of Supervisors v. Fiechter,15° a Pennsylvania court
relied on Nollan to rule that the township board of supervisors could
not condition subdivision approval on the dedication of eight and one-
half feet of road frontage property to the township.' In Fiechter,
the property owners sought approval from the township to divide
their twenty-five and one-half acre lot into two equal parcels.
1 2
The road abutting the lot had an existing right of way thirty-three feet
wide; however, the township ordinance required a fifty-foot right of
way.5 The board conditioned approval on the dedication of
private property to be used as a right of way."s The landowners
refused and brought suit arguing that a regulatory taking had
occurred. 55  The court agreed that the ordinance's street-width
requirement applied to the property owners because their land
bordered the street; however, the court found that the ordinance did
not require that land be dedicated to the township.156 In addition,
even if the ordinance did authorize the dedication, the court realized
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 914.
148. Id.
149. Id.; see also Rohn v. City of Vasalia, 263 Cal. Rptr. 319, 325-28 (Cal. Ct. App.
1989) (holding that conditioning the issuance of a building permit on the dedication of land
for street alignment was unconstitutional because there was no nexus between the
renovation and the dedication requirement).
150. 566 A.2d 370 (Pa. Commw. 1989).
151. Id. at 373.
152. Id. at 371.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 370-71.
156. Id. at 371.
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that, based on Nollan, constitutional questions would have to be
addressed."s Specifically, the board would have to show how the
two-lot subdivision would impact the burden on the public so as to
"provide a police power justification for demanding that the lan-
downer make a special, uncompensated contribution to the adjacent
local street."'' 8 Because the township failed to make this showing,
the court held that subdivision approval could not be conditioned on
dedication of a public right of way.
59
In contrast to the decisions in Castle Properties, William J. Jones
Insurance, and Fiechter, other lower courts have interpreted Nollan's
nexus standard to require a much looser connection."6 In Commer-
cial Builders v. City of Sacramento,6' the court upheld a city- or-
dinance that conditioned nonresidential building permits on the
payment of impact fees. 62 These fees were intended to offset the
increased need for low income housing that would be caused by
development since low-income workers would be drawn to the
area. 63  Agreeing that the need for low-income housing is a
legitimate state interest, the developers argued that the city failed to
determine accurately the need for low-income housing attributable to
the new nonresidential development." 4 The court rejected the
developers' takings argument, stating that "Nollan does not stand for
the proposition that an exaction ordinance will be upheld only where
it can be shown that the development is directly responsible for the
social ill in question.', 6
157. Id. at 372.
158. Id. at 373.
159. Id.
160. See infra notes 161-74 and accompanying text; accord Joint Ventures, Inc. v.
Department of Transp., 563 So. 2d 622, 626-28 (Fla. 1990); Orlando/Orange County
Exliressway Auth. v. W & F Agrigrowth-Femfield Ltd., 582 So. 2d 790,792 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1991); Gardner v. New Jersey Pinelands Comm'n, 593 A.2d 251,263-64 (NJ. 1991).
161. 941 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1997 (1992); see, e.g., Philip
S. Simmons, Note, Commercial Builders Revisits Nollan." Constitutional Taking and the
Limits of Regulatory Exceptions, 13 WHrrrIR L. REV. 937, 937-77 (1992); Timothy M.
Tesluk, Comment, Commercial Builders of N. California v. City of Sacramento: Com-
merce Creates Poverty, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1339, 1339-69 (1992).
162. Commercial Builders, 941 F.2d at 876.
163. Id. at 873.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 875. The court held that "the nexus between the fee provision here at issue,
designed to further the city's legitimate interest in housing, and the burdens caused by
commercial development is sufficient to pass constitutional muster." Id.
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Similarly, in Blue Jeans Equities West v. City and County,' the
court declined to extend the Nollan analysis to conditions that require
the payment of impact fees, holding that the essential nexus showing
applies only to exactions that require the actual dedication of private
property.67 In Blue Jeans, the owner and developer of an office,
retail, and condominium plaza applied for a development permit.'
The permit was approved subject to the payment of a transit impact
development fee intended to offset anticipated increased traffic
burdens that the development would generate. 69 The developer
argued that because the plaza was located away from the traditional
downtown area, the city failed to show how this particular develop-
ment would adversely impact public transportation. 7 0  The court
framed the issue as whether the Nollan nexus test should be applied
to situations in which the government is requiring an impact fee
rather than the dedication of property.71  Citing prior Supreme
Court cases,' 2 the court wrote that "the high court appears to make
a distinction between 'regulatory takings,' i.e., economic regulation,
most forms of zoning, and other restrictions on land use, and
'possessory takings,' where the government, or an authorized third
person physically intrudes upon or appropriates the property.""7
The court concluded that the Nollan essential nexus test was limited
to development conditions and possessory takings rather than
restrictions or regulations in the form of impact fees, and that the
ordinance in Blue Jeans therefore should be upheld. 74
Based on this development of the law and the confusion that
lower courts have met trying to apply the Nollan test consistently, 75
166. 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 114 (Cal. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 191 (1992).
167. Id. at 117.
168. Id. at 115-16.
169. Id. at 116.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 117.
172. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304 (1987); Nollan v. California Coastal Conm'n, 483 U.S. 823 (1987); Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104
(1978); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
173. Blue Jeans, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 117.
174. Id. at 118.
175. See supra notes 135-74 and accompanying text. The courts in Castle Properties,
William J. Jones Insurance, and Fiechter each applied a higher level of scrutiny to
government regulations than the courts in Commercial Builders and Blue Jeans. For a
discussion of levels of scrutiny applied in takings claims, see infra notes 182-95 and
accompanying text.
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Dolan is the next logical step in the doctrine of regulatory takings. 76
In Nollan, Justice Scalia acknowledged that "[o]ur cases have not
elaborated on... what type of connection between the regulation and
the state interest satisfies the requirement that the former 'substantia-
ly advance' the latter."'77  By holding in Dolan that imposed
conditions and the projected development impact must be roughly
proportional to each other, the Court has finally explained to what
degree an essential nexus is necessary to withstand constitutional
scrutiny.'78 Under this standard, the government must determine
that the required condition is related "both in nature and extent to
the impact of the proposed development."' 79 The Court's examina-
tion of a series of lower court decisions prior to Nollan'" revealed
that lower court standards for the required degree of connection have
generally been one of three levels of scrutiny: reasonable relation-
ship, uniquely and specifically attributable, and the intermediate
rational nexus standard. 8
Some states have required only a general, reasonable relationship
between the dedication and the proposed development." Under
176. At least one commentator discussing Nollan has noted the Court's failure to
address the degree of connection required: "The Court thus properly disposed of the case
before it, yet it failed to clearly set forth a standard for determining when the nexus
between permit condition and public need is sufficiently close to satisfy the substantially
advance test." Peter F. Neronha, Note, A Constitutional Standard of Review for Permit
Conditions, Exactions and Linkage Programs: Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,
30 B.C. L. REv. 903, 929 (1989); see also supra notes 4346 and accompanying text.
177. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825,834 (1987) (citing Agins v. City
of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
178. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2319.
179. Id. at 2320.
180. Id. at 2318-19.
181. For a general discussion of the three basic levels of scrutiny that have been applied
to takings claims, see David L. Callies, Property Rights: Are There Any Left?, in
REGULATORY TAKINGS: THE LIMITS OF LAND USE CONTROLS 247,283 (G. Richard Hill
ed., 1993); R. Marlin Smith, From Subdivision Requirements to Community Benefit
Assessment and Linkage Payments: A Brief History of Land Development Exactions, 50
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 11-14 (1987).
182. For a discussion of the reasonable relationship standard, see William A. Falik &
Anna C. Shimko, The "Takings" Nexus-The Supreme Court Chooses a New Direction in
Land Use Planning: A View From California, 39 HASTINGS LJ. 359, 385 n.149 (1988);
Julian C. Juergensmeyer & Robert M. Blake, Impact Fees: An Answer to Local
Governments' Capital Financing Dilemma, 9 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 415, 427-33 (1988);
Neronha, supra note 176, at 909; Theodore C. Taub, Development Exactions and Impact
Fees, C872 ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY 269, 273 (1993). While commentators and
scholars have referred to this least exacting level of scrutiny as the reasonable or rational
relationship test, the Dolan court explained this level of scrutiny by simply stating, "[i]n
some States, very generalized statements as to the necessary connection between the
required dedication and the proposed development seem to suffice. We think this
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this standard, a court will look at the development's size, the burdens
on society that will be created by the development, and the effect the
development will have on local government. The government has
nearly unlimited discretion to impose conditions on development
because the court does not require the local government to prove how
a particular development will impact society,'" Although rejected
by most states, some California courts have applied this minimal
standard in takings cases by simply requiring a showing that the
development project will generally impact the public in the manner
the condition or exaction addresses."l Arguing that this standard
fails adequately to protect private property from unconstitutional
government objectives, the Dolan Court, like most lower courts,
rejected the reasonable relationship level of scrutiny."
A more exacting standard imposed by some states is the
"uniquely and specifically attributable test. 1 86 To validate develop-
ment exactions under this rigorous test, the government must show
that the proposed development itself has created the specific and
unique need that will be addressed by the condition."8 Unlike the
standard is too lax to adequately protect petitioner's right to just compensation if her
property is taken for a public purpose." Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2318-19.
183. Taub, supra note 182, at 273.
184. See Associated Home Builders of Greater East Bay, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek,
484 P.2d 606, 610 (Cal. 1971) (upholding an exaction for recreational lands without
requiring the state to explain how the development in question would directly cause a lack
of recreational parks); Grupe v. California Coastal Comm'n, 212 Cal. Rptr. 578, 601-02
(Cal. App. 1985) (stating that only an indirect relationship between exaction and impact
of the development was required to uphold constitutionality of easement condition). For
examples of other states that have applied this standard, see Billings Properties, Inc. v.
Yellowstone County, 394 P.2d 182, 188 (Mont. 1964) (holding that a rational statutory
requirement for the dedication of land for parks and playgrounds is a valid exercise of
police power); Jenad, Inc. v. Scarsdale, 218 N.E.2d 673, 676 (N.Y. 1966) (upholding as a
reasonable form of village planning a requirement that subdivision pay a fee in lieu of
dedication of recreational land).
185. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2318.
186. For courts that have applied the "uniquely and specifically attributable test," see
Krughoff v. City of Naperville, 369 N.E.2d 892, 895 (I1. 1977) (upholding a dedication of
land or fees because the development specifically and uniquely created the need for new
schools and parks); Pioneer Trust & Say. Bank v. Mount Prospect, 176 N.E.2d 799,801-02
(M11. 961) (finding an unconstitutional taking where local government failed to show that
the need for additional schools and parks was directly caused by the new development);
Frank Ansuini, Inc. v. Cranston, 264 A.2d 910, 913 (R.I. 1970) (striking down an ordinance
that required all developers to dedicate seven percent of their land for recreational
purposes without apportioning dedication requirements based on need created by each
particular development); accord Aunt Hack Ridge Estates, Inc. v. Planning Comm'n of
Danbury, 230 A.2d 45, 47 (Conn. 1967); J.E.D. Assocs., Inc. v. Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 15
(N.H. 1981); McKain v. Toledo City Plan Comm'n, 270 N.E.2d 370, 374 (Ohio 1971).
187. Taub, supra note 182, at 273.
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first level of scrutiny, under which the government had to show only
that a general public need existed and was enhanced by the develop-
ment, under the stricter scrutiny the government must demonstrate
that the development created the need and that the exaction is
directly related to that need." The Dolan Court rejected this strict
standard because exactions essentially could be imposed only to
satisfy needs specifically and uniquely attributable to the particular
development. 9 Therefore, exactions would be "takings" unless the
municipality could demonstrate that the "exaction is directly
proportional to the specifically created need"'---a standard the
Court found too demanding for Fifth Amendment analysis.
A third standard applied by a majority of courts is the rational
nexus test.'9' Under this level of scrutiny, courts require local
governments to show a concrete connection between the required
dedication and the development's projected impact.Y Unlike the
strict scrutiny test, imposed exactions do not have to be based on
needs uniquely and specifically attributable to the projected impact of
a development.Y Instead, the government must demonstrate that
the development will contribute to the public need. Although less
188. Neronha, supra note 176, at 915.
189. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2319. The Court noted that "[w]e do not think the Federal
Constitution requires such exacting scrutiny, given the nature of the interests involved."
Id.
190. Id.
191. For a discussion of the intermediate rational nexus test, see Falik & Shimko, supra
note 182, at 385 n.149; Juergensmeyer & Blake, supra note 182, at 427-33; Neronha, supra
note 176, at 914; Taub, supra note 182, at 274. Scholars generally refer to this intermediate
level as the rational nexus test; however, in Dolan the Court articulated the standard as
the reasonable relationship test. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2319 ("A number of state courts
have taken an intermediate position, requiring the municipality to show a 'reasonable
relationship' between the required dedication and the impact of the proposed develop-
ment.").
192. Taub, supra note 182, at 274. For cases applying the rational nexus standard, see
Wald Corp. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 338 So. 2d 863, 868 (Fla. 1976) (upholding a
subdivision exaction ordinance because evidence established that the exaction alleviated
adverse impact of the development on the public); Simpson v. North Platte, 292 N.W.2d
297,301 (Neb. 1980) (holding that an appropriate exercise of police power depends on the
relationship between the government's exaction and the impact of the project); Jordan v.
Village of Menomonee Falls, 137 N.W.2d 442, 447 (Wis. 1965) (upholding a dedication
requirement for schools and recreational land because evidence established a rational
connection between the exaction and needs created by development); accord Collis v. City
of Bloomington, 246 N.W.2d 19, 26 (Minn. 1976); Land/Vest Properties, Inc. v. Town of
Plainfield, 379 A.2d 200,204-05 (N.H. 1977); City of College Station v. Turtle Rock Corp.,
680 S.W.2d 802, 807 (Tex. 1984); Call v. City of West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217, 221 (Utah
1979).
193. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
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rigid than the uniquely and specifically attributable test, this standard
does not allow exactions to be justified on any general need in the
community regardless of whether the condition is proportionate to the
impacts generated by the development.194 Instead, this level of
scrutiny strikes a middle ground by requiring that exactions only be
imposed on a property owner in proportion to the additional needs
or demands upon the municipality that the proposed development
creates. 9 '
A majority of lower courts have applied the rational nexus stan-
dard-ultimately adopted in Dolan and rephrased as the rough
proportionality test'96-in the following manner:
The first prong of the test requires that the need for the
additional facility or service be created by the development
being assessed, and that the assessment not exceed the cost
of meeting the needs created by the new development. The
second prong requires that the development being assessed
derive some meaningful benefit from the use of the funds
collected, although the benefit need not be exclusive to the
development being assessed.' 97
The Dolan Court's decision to adopt this intermediate standard is
consistent with prior takings doctrine. In Agins v. City of
Tiburon,98 the Court first required that a condition "substantially
advance legitimate state interests."1" In Agins, the Court held that
the state interest in preserving open space was advanced by the
zoning ordinance applying density restrictions.2" The Court found
the ordinances to be part of an overall scheme for residential develop-
ment rationally applied to "protect ... residents ... from the ill
effects of urbanization.""2 1 Finding that the property owner could
still develop five homes on the five acre tract, the Court denied the
taking claim.2' Here, the Court required more than a reasonable
or rational relationship but less than the exacting standard of the
uniquely and specifically attributable test. In other words, although
the zoning ordinances were required to "substantially advance a
194. Neronha, supra note 176, at 916.
195. Taub, supra note 182, at 274-75.
196. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2319-20; see supra text accompanying note 50.
197. Taub, supra note 182, at 274.
198. 447 U.S. 255 (1980); see supra notes 108-20 and accompanying text.
199. Agins, 447 U.S. at 260.
200. Id. at 262.
201. Id. at 261-62.
202. Id. at 262-63.
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legitimate state interest," the city did not have to show that the
petitioner's development alone created the open space problem. 3
Dolan also expanded upon the standard developed in Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission. In Nollan, the "substantially
advance" test applied by the Court could be satisfied by
demonstrating an essential nexus between the permit condition and
the additional needs created by the development that the condition
seeks to mitigate.' 5 The Court ruled in Nollan that the permit
condition requiring the Nollans to grant a public easement for lateral
access across their beach did not substantially advance the legitimate
state interest of enhancing the visibility of the beach for the general
public.' Therefore, the city was prevented from requiring a lateral
easement because no nexus was found between the condition and the
state's purpose in requiring the condition. With regard to degree of
nexus required, the Court did not specifically adopt a particular
standard to be applied in future cases; instead, the Court accepted the
minimal reasonable relationship standard suggested by the Commis-
sion "for purposes of discussion."' The Court then recognized that
the conditions in Nollan did "not meet even the most untailored
standards" because "[i]t is quite impossible to understand how a
requirement that people already on the public beaches be able to
walk across the Nollans' property reduces any obstacles to viewing the
beach created by the new house." Although the Court did not
require a specific degree of connection in Nollan, Justice Scalia did
recognize in a footnote that the Court has long required more than a
rational, general connection. Therefore, the "rough propor-
tionality" degree of connection the Dolan Court decided to apply to
takings claims has some precedent in the Nollan opinion.
The Court's adoption of the intermediate standard in Dolan thus
flows from the Court's decisions in Agins210 and Nollan,2 ' and was
even predicted by scholars writing on the subject of takings."' As
203. Id. at 260-61.
204. 483 U.S. 825 (1987); see also supra notes 121-31 and accompanying text.
205. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
206. Id. at 838-39.
207. Id. at 838.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 834 n.3.
210. 447 U.S. 255 (1980); see also supra notes 108-20 and accompanying text.
211. 483 U.S. 825 (1987); see also supra notes 121-31 and accompanying text.
212. See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 121, at 259-64 (discussing the case's application in
the future with respect to level of scrutiny); James L. Oakes, "Property Rights" in
Constitutional Analysis Today, 56 WASH. L. REV. 583, 625-26 (1981) (acknowledging that
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in Agins and Nollan, the Court first subjected the development
exactions in Dolan to the essential nexus standard to determine
whether the permit conditions would substantially advance a
legitimate state interest.2 13 After finding a sufficient relation
between the imposed conditions and the public needs they sought to
address, the Dolan Court needed to determine what degree of
connection should be required. Although in Nollan the Court did not
specifically adopt a level of scrutiny, it did require something more
than a general reasonable connection, indicating that the Court in the
future would be willing to require a standard more stringent than
reasonable relation.214
With the proper level of scrutiny now articulated in Dolan, a
local government cannot identify a need in society-such as lack of
visual access to the ocean or flood plain excavation-and then simply
impose a permit condition to satisfy that need without demonstrating
that the development will create the need or contribute to it.215
However, unlike the requirements of the stricter standard,216 the
government does not have to show that the particular development
in question is solely responsible for the burdens that the condition is
attempting to address. Instead, the government must make an
individual determination that the development has contributed to the
problem.217 Dolan makes clear that the government must prove that
the condition is "roughly proportional" to the needs to which the
development has contributed. In Dolan, for example, the Court
agreed that the proposed project would contribute to the risk of
flooding and increase in traffic.21 8 However, the Court determined
a new judicial era will provide broader recognition of property rights); Craig A. Peterson,
Land Use Regulatory "Takings" Revisited: The New Supreme Court Approaches, 39
HASTINGS LI. 335, 338 (1988) (noting that more than a rational relationship has been
required by the Supreme Court); Michael G. Trachtman, Comment, Subdivision Exactions:
The Constitutional Issues, the Judicial Response, and the Pennsylvania Situation, 19 VILL.
L. REv. 782, 795-807 (1974) (predicting that the rational nexus standard would be adopted
by a majority of courts).
213. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2317.
214. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837. The Commission was unable to demonstrate a sufficient
nexus between imposed conditions and the public needs they sought to address; therefore,
the Commission did not meet the essential nexus test and the inquiry ended. Id.
215. Dolan, 114 U.S. at 2319 ("[A] city may not require a property owner to dedicate
private property for some future public use as a condition of obtaining a building permit
when such future use is not 'occasioned by the construction sought to be permitted.'
(citing Simpson v. North Platte, 292 N.W.2d 297, 302 (Neb. 1980))).
216. See supra notes 186-90 and accompanying text.
217. Neronha, supra note 176, at 930-31.
218. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2318.
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that the relatively harsh dedication requirement imposed by the city
was not proportional to the degree of public burden that Dolan's
development would impose on the city.219
The Dolan rough proportionality standard is new to regulatory
takings doctrine in that the Court did not identify a required nexus at
all in prior cases.' However, prior to Dolan, many jurisdictions
already were requiring local governments to justify dedication
requirements in terms of proportionality.' For example, in William
. Jones Insurance v. City of Fort Smith,' the Arkansas district
court demanded that the city justify its request for a right of way
dedication by showing how the traffic would change as a result of the
property owner's development.' The court was clearly holding the
city to a standard similar to rough proportionality. Rather than
simply accepting the city's testimony that convenience stores had a
certain number of cars associated with them over time, the court
required a determination specific to this development. 4
Similarly, in Castle Properties Co. v. Ackerson t the New York
appellate court ruled that the Planning Board had to justify its right
of way dedication requirements by showing empirical evidence about
how and to what degree the plaintiff's office and warehouse building
would adversely affect traffic and safety in the area. , In addition,
the Pennsylvania court in Board of Supervisors v. Fiechte,'z ruled
that a dedication of private property for public use would be a taking
requiring just compensation unless the proposed development created
special needs that could be addressed only through the dedication of
a public right of way.t
The courts in the above cases all required an individual showing
of how a proposed project would contribute to problems in society.
All three required the governmental body conditioning the permits to
provide specific evidence, even empirical data, to demonstrate how
the condition would offset the demands created by the new develop-
219. Id. at 2321-22.
220. See supra notes 46, 121-31 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 186, 191-92 and accompanying text.
222. 731 F. Supp. 912 (W.D. Ark. 1990); see supra notes 142-49 and accompanying text.
223. William J. Jones Ins., 731 F. Supp. at 914.
224. Id.
225. 558 N.Y.S.2d 334 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990); see supra notes 135-41 and accompanying
text.
226. Castle Properties Co., 558 N.Y.S.2d at 336-37.
227. 566 A.2d 370 (Pa. Commw. 1989); see supra notes 150-59 and accompanying text.
228. Fiechter, 566 A.2d at 373.
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ments. In this sense, Dolan merely elevates to a federal constitutional
level a degree of scrutiny that these and other lower courts had
already required. Thus, for those courts demanding an individual
determination that dedications be proportionally related to the impact
of a development, the Dolan decision adds nothing new to the
inquiry. As Justice Souter contended, Dolan could have been decided
by simply following Nollan's analysis, in which the Court implied that
a rational nexus standard for judicial review was involved in
regulatory title takings. 9
The impact of Dolan will be most evident in courts that refused
to elevate their requirements for judicial review of development
conditions after Nollan. For example, in Commercial Builders of
Northern California v. City of Sacramento," the city might now
have to apportion the amount of the impact fee imposed on non-
residential developers based on an individual finding that a particular
development will increase the demand for low income housing.23'
Similarly, if Blue Jeans Equities West v. City and County 2 were to
arise today, the court might have to conduct a study to determine how
and to what degree the location of the property owner's plaza will
affect the transit system 33  Were such a showing made, the city
might then impose impact fees on the development, limited to the
proportion of the proposed development's projected impact.
The definition of "rough proportionality" is still vague, however,
and may not apply to cases that do not involve the dedication of
private property to the government. The rough proportionality
standard could be limited to situations in which the government is
conditioning a building permit on the dedication of private property.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion did not broadly extend the rough
229. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2331 (Souter, J., dissenting). In Nollan, the Court stated:
[O]ur opinions do not establish that these standards are the same as those
applied to due process or equal protection claims. To the contrary, our verbal
formulations in the takings field have generally been quite different. We have
required that the regulation "substantially advance" the "legitimate state interest"
sought to be achieved, not that "the State could have rationally decided that the
measure adopted might achieve the State's objective."
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 n.3 (1987) (quoting Minnesota v.
Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466 (1981)).
230. 941 F.2d 872 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1997 (1991); see also supra notes
161-65 and accompanying text.
231. Commercial Builders, 941 F.2d at 877-78.
232. 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 114 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); see also supra notes 166-74 and accom-
panying text.
233. Blue Jeans, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 119.
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proportionality standard to all types of land use regulations. Instead,
he stated that the standard of rough proportionality should be applied
to determine whether the degree of land dedication exactions imposed
on a property owner bear the required relationship to the impact of
the development.' However, the Court may later determine that
the imposition of an impact fee can be, in certain circumstances, as
unjustified and intrusive as dedication requirements. This form of
land use regulation is widespread, 5 and some scholars have argued
that impact fees or non-title regulatory takings may impinge
constitutional rights as much as possessory takings or what some have
called regulatory title takings.36
In practical terms, Dolan's greatest immediate impact is that the
rough proportionality standard is now constitutionally required.
States can no longer apply varying standards when examining
development conditions.37 Dolan also places the burden of proof
on the government to justify the regulation. 3 Generally, when a
zoning ordinance is challenged, the burden of proof "rests on the
party challenging the regulation to prove that it constitutes an
arbitrary regulation of property rights." 9  By shifting the burden
of proof, property owners will no longer bear the often insurmoun-
table burden of proving that a regulation is unreasonable. Instead,
the Dolan majority contended that requiring the municipality to
demonstrate rough proportionality would provide a constitutional
check on the government's police power.24 Another possible effect
of the shift in burden of proof is the potential negative impact it may
have on local governments' efforts to implement zoning requirements
234. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2319-20.
235. As Justice Blackmun wrote: "The Court's recent Taking Clause decisions teach
that non-physical government intrusions on private property, such as zoning ordinances
and other land-use restrictions, have become the rule rather than the exception." Loretto
v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 447 (1982) (Blackmun, J., dissen-
ting).
236. See, e.g., Michael M. Berger, Happy Birthday Constitution: The Supreme Court
Establishes New Ground Rules for Land Use Planning, in REGULATORY TAKING: THE
LIMITS OF LAND USE CONTROL 357, 405 (G. Richard Hill ed., 1993) (arguing that there
is no principled reason why the law should distinguish between physical and regulatory
takings).
237. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2320. Chief Justice Rehnquist noted: "We see no reason why
the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as much a part of the Bill of Rights as the
First Amendment or Fourth Amendment, should be relegated to the status of a poor
relation in these comparable circumstances." Id.
238. Id. at 2323 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
239. Id. at 2320 n.8.
240. Id. at 2322.
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to protect the public welfare?"4 As Justice Stevens argued, saddling
a city with the heightened burden of a rough proportionality showing
will make city planning much more difficult.242  Yet, local
governments can still wield the power to require property develop-
ment concessions as long as they are proportional to the impact of the
development at issue.
Dolan is yet another step toward the development of a
categorical framework in which takings claims can be analyzed. For
many lower courts, the rough proportionality analysis may simply
rephrase standards they have already required.243 For other courts,
however, the impact of Dolan is less clear.2' Some have hailed the
decision as a significant victory for private property rights.245
However, Dolan may not apply beyond its facts to monetary exactions
where the government demands a mitigation fee from the landowner
in exchange for a permit.
Dolan is consistent with the Court's insistence on reasonableness
in the implementation of land-use regulations, and most likely will
result in only minimal immediate changes in the practice of local land
use planning.2" Dedications will still be available to local planning
boards; however, individual property owners will be entitled to an in-
dividualized examination under the heightened scrutiny of rough
241. Id. at 2329 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
242. Justice Stevens wrote:
In our changing world one thing is certain: uncertainty will characterize
predictions about the impact of new urban developments on the risks of floods,
earthquakes, traffic congestion, or environmental harms. Where there is doubt
concerning the magnitude of those impacts, the public interest in averting them
must outweigh the private interest of the commercial entrepreneur.
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
243. See supra notes 135-59 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 160-74 and accompanying text.
245. See Michael M. Berger, Property Owners Have Rights, Too, L.A. TIMES, July 3,
1994, at 5; Richard A. Epstein & William Mellor, Reining in the Land-Use Planners, CHI.
TRm., July 22, 1994, at 23 (arguing that "a presumption in favor of liberty-rather than
in favor of government regulation-provides a strong weapon to individuals confronted
by government infringement of their rights").
246. See Joan Biskupic, Justices Broaden Property Rights; Land Use Requirements May
Be Takings, WASH. POST, June 25, 1994, at Al (concluding that the Court's ruling may
require planners to be more careful but will have little impact on the area); Proportionality
and Land Use, SACRAMENTO BEE, July 3, 1994 at F04 (stating that the rough
proportionality standard "should not produce any radical changes in the daily conduct of
local planning").
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proportionality in an effort to guarantee that conditions are rationally
and fairly administered.
KRISTEN P. SOSNOSKY

